The Causes Of World War One Essay Example for Free

The Causes Of World War One EssayIn the immediate view, it seems that at that place are twain main billets attributed to the origins of the low World War. One is that the contend was be after, the opposite that it occurred collectible to accident and miscalculation. I nonplus to give a detailed analysis of these two arguments with the focus being on the main European powers at the time Germ both, Great Britain, France and Russia. It is my view that the First World War was effectively computer programmened, every be it for a later date, and that collectible to some miscalculations, it was indeed brought for fightd so that fight would break reveal in Europe in August 1914. Using sources from various historians, I will argue this stopover of a planned struggle blaming it almost solely on the part of the German Empire and hire in the other side of the argument, that the First World War was the result of accident and miscalculation. The most burning(prenominal) i dea in the argument that Germany planned the First World War is to be found in the Foreign Policies that she pursued from the late Nineteenth Century to the come outbreak of fight in 1914. It was the view that no matter how achieved, a German dominated Europe would provide a successful base for the rarefied of Weltpolitik. This idea of Weltpolitik was the work out at the head of the hierarchy of German Foreign Policy it gave the nonion of a ground mission, but an aggressive one, a mission where no man or nation would kiosk in the way of its target areas.The key point when describing German Foreign Policy before 1914 is of their willingness to risk war for their own gains in order to achieve arena domination and the status of a major power. Michael Gordon argues that this war Germany risked did non, in their minds, involve Britain their vastest rival As far as German policy is concerned, its courtesy to risk war for its own ends either a local Balkan war fought by it s all(a)y in Vienna or a larger, continental-sized war in which it, France and Russia participated now seems unshakably established. therefore it seems that by 1914, the Germans had already decided that some form of war would occur. It is also evident that she had a clear plan of her ambitions and legions aims later undone by her miscalculation of British and Russian policy which would result in a German dominated Europe By either one of these two wars the German government purpose its interests would be served at minimum, a successful localised war kept limited by Russias fill-in off in fear would in the German view probably break up the Franco-Russian alliance, down up the tottering Austro-Hungarian Empire, and clear the way in Central Europe for an change surfacetual German find to successful Weltpolitik.It is my view that German Foreign Policy therefore prescribe a planned war. This planned war may have been intend to be a fairly localised routine, but then the Germa ns had obviously either been misled or been ignorant to the stances of both Britain and Russia concerning this idea. Gordon argues that German leaders did not consciously aim at it , but that world war only if emanated from continental war in 1914. The previous German generation were devotees of the world policy , devised by Bismarck but taken up and massively increase by his successor Kaiser Wilhelm II. On his accession to the German throne in July 1888, Wilhelm quickly position out his programme for country he wanted to secure Germany a egress in the sun . This could have meant anything, but translated, it meant that the basic and primary idea was to destroy Englands position in the world to Germanys advantage . besides translated, the Kaisers ideas aspire to the German jealousy of Britain and her wealth, colonial rule, industrialisation and above all, world nautical supremacy. Previous wars of the azoic Twentieth Century, for example, the Sino-Japanese and Boer Wars had pro ved the importance of sea power. Fritz Fischer argues that the construction of a great fleet was at the concentre of Germanys political plans and that to build such a supreme fleet was the only way of catching up with Britain and being equal to other world powers.Again this jealousy is re-iterated by the lack of self-belief from the German government. We bay window see therefore, that her Foreign Policy was aggressive when it need not have been and that the idea of Weltpolitik was based on insurances from her huge army and navy. The government now had the full backing of groups of industry, which now heavily concentrated on shipbuilding. Pre-war German Foreign Policy can be summed up by Max Schinkel, the director of Germanys imprimatur largest bank the broader basis in Europe was necessary for laying economic foundations of German world policy It can be argued that this world policy originated under Bismarckian rule, but it is my view that Bismarck merely fuelled the German peopl e with ideas and the accession of Wilhelm made sure that these changes were not only made, but also radically altered and put harshly into place. All armies make plans. until now do they make such particular and intentional plans as the Germans did before the First World War? The main reason that people suppose Germany planned the war is due to the Schlieffen conception. However, as John Keegan argues, the Schlieffen formulate was merely a military affair with military objectives if such a conflict in Europe arose.However it did contain very precise aims in accordance with where the first attacks would be made and then where the majority of fighting would take place In no sense did it precipitate the First World War Neither did its failure it was a plan for a quick victory in a short war Neverthe slight, Schlieffens plan dictated where the wars focus would lie and through its innate flaws, the possibility of its protraction. I believe that what Schlieffen had in mind was a pur ely military plan, if, by chance, such a crisis arose. I do not believe that Schlieffen himself had anything to do with how the war came into being he was purely commissioned to draft such a plan. However, the Kaiser, who wanted this war plan d bare-assedn up, did have many ulterior motives. He is the main figure in Germany at this time and it is very much as what he says goes. No one would dare question him due to his absolute intolerance of argumentative characters.What Schlieffen came up with was a plan pregnant with dangerous perplexity the uncertainty of the quick victory it was designed to achieve the greater uncertainty of what would follow if it did not attain its intended object. it seems, therefore, that the Germans, although they had this plan, had no kind of backup or alternative strategy. That idea is typical of the Kaisers character. On many cause he would just throw everything out of the window and go for his objectives by the shortest possible route. This also conf irms and is sustain by the definition of Weltpolitik that no man or nation would stand in the way of Germany. Did other countries have war plans? Yes, of course, but none were as grandiose and as specific as the German idea. The cut war plan confirmed her timidity in the face of her great enemy Germany. At first, they toyed with the idea of defence of the common frontier in the event of war , as A French attack was though impossible by reason of disparity of numbers. A static French community of forty million could not challenge an expanding German population already fifty million pissed and ascent fast ..However, this was later disposed of and after some altercation concerning which was the best form of attack, Plan XVII was created in April 1913 but kept secret until the outbreak of war which dictated a precipitant attack across the common Franco-German frontier, into Lorraine and towards the Rhine . This then became the French war plan. It was minimal and uncomplicated co mpared to that of Germany and in my depression how a war plan should be set out. I believe a war plan should contain certain objectives, but mostly a lot of room to manoeuvre as there is ceaselessly the problem of miscalculation (which Germany will later become the victim of). It is Fischers view (and I am inclined to agree with him) that it is the idea of world power and German domination that led to the outbreak of war. He argues that Germanys claim to world power was based on her consciousness of being a young, growing and rising nation . This national expansion on all fronts meant that Germany was developing into a highly industrialised merchandise country. However she was running out of options, with so many enemies, of finding markets and vulgar materials.This did not affect the Germans and compete right into their hands and their world mission idea. Through this forced change of markets, she shifted her trade from the traditions of Britain, France and Europe to a worldwi de trade in 1913 the share of Europe in her imports and exports had gone down by 30 per cent overseas countries, the tropics and above all South America, were supplying an increasing proportion of her raw materials. This advance of Germany in the world of business was based on the expansion of the great iron and leaf blade industry, however fresh industries, including global communications, were starting to become successful. Therefore this reinforces the view that Germany was becoming a great power and that the people themselves through the Kaisers erratic ideas vista that they were becoming a real force and that the world mission was now a realistic target. It had already been proven that naval power was an incredibly primary(prenominal) asset for a country to own to free herself from dependence on British ships.., to enable her to bring her exports, financed by her own capital, to their markets abroad without British middle-men, Germany had to have her own merchant marine. t he idea of this new naval power was that it would protect shipping and force Britain to regard her as an equal.However I believe that the new German Navy was a status symbol as much as it was a muscular weapon, as all of these domestic policies were geared towards strengthening Germany and therefore, it being easier to weaken other countries. Moreover, with her lack of raw materials, it became difficult for Germany to maintain her penetration of world markets the narrowness of her raw materials market became increasingly apparent, and as she penetrated to a greater extent deeply into world markets, this narrowness became more irksome. by now we can see the extent of Germanys (but preponderantly the Kaisers) ideas. It is clear that there are no alternatives but to go for the highest objective by the quickest route, ignoring all other possibilities. I believe that these policies were absurd considering how close they were to fulfilling their goal of Weltpolitik. When taking into acco unt the second argument that the First World War was the result of accident and miscalculation, I do not believe that any causes of the war can be attributed to accident, because when nations have such rigid policies and plans concerning Foreign and Domestic Policies and long-term war plans, it is impossible to see how any accidents can happen.However there were a miscalculations made, although I do not believe that these miscalculations were direct causes of the First World War. The idea of a German dominated Europe and all of Germanys war plans were greatly undone by her total miscalculation of British and Russian policy. As previously mentioned German Policy makers believed that their fight would be a short, successful and localised affair, due to Russia being alike weak to try to deal with Germany now this Great Power at minimum, a successful, localised war kept limited by Russias backing off in fear it is clear that the Germans really thought that Russia was basically insig nificant. They drew this conclusion from the fact that Russia had already fought in a large war less than ten years earlier the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 as Russias drive across Asia and the Far-East continued. However, either by Russias secrecy or by Germanys lack of detailed research, the German government did not realise that Russia would be able, not only to defend herself, but also to attack Germany. After much confrontation in the Balkans, Kaiser Wilhelm II was convinced that we shall soon see the third chapter of the Balkan wars in which we shall be involved .He was convinced that the remnant of powers depended on that in the Balkans. It was to be these relatively small Balkan Wars that would lead to world war. The Kaiser gave the notion that Germany could deal with that though and therefore started to lay out diplomatic ideas for war with Russia. I believe that a German-Russian war was unceasingly going to occur it was just a matter of when. In conversation with Arch duke Franz Ferdinand the German Ambassador to Serbia the Kaiser argued that it was alert for Austria-Hungary her great ally to take action against Serbia, and that Russia wouldnt oppose, as she was by no means ready for war . However, with the assassination of Ferdinand by the Serbs, Germany agreed that the Balkan crisis was irreconcilable. Therefore, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia and this was a move designed to rectify Germanys position for eventual war with Russia. However, German assumption that Russia wasnt ready for war and wouldnt oppose Austria-Hungarys actions proved to be mistaken. Therefore, this eventual German-Russian war followed by four days and not four years as it had been laid out to do in 1917 in accordance with the Schlieffen Plan. However, Wilhelms arrogance and stupidity grew further.He saw the German-Russian war merely as a nuisance and that the Russian recovery gave them an unexpected problem, as their main objective was to acquire extra Europea n Empire at Britains expense. I believe it was Russias spatial relation that Germany miscalculated, as she was and always has been a very secretive nation. We can also see through the alliances, how this conflict merged into world war. Moreover Germany underestimated Britain. She saw her archrival as being merely a diplomatic power, which was not big plentiful or daring enough to risk war for the sake of others. I believe it was this German attitude and her supposed increased threat that caused Britain to intervene militarily, more than her alliance with Russia. Therefore due to these great miscalculations, the Schlieffen Plan became void and Germany found herself encircled and in a world war situation. I have already mentioned that Schlieffens plan was pregnant with dangerous uncertainty of what would follow if it did not attain its intended objectives , and that is precisely what happened. Since the Germans had no backup plan, they forced themselves into a situation for which th ey werent prepared.Keegan finally points out that Secret plans determined that any crisis not settled by sensible diplomacy would, in the circumstances prevailing in Europe in 1914 lead to general war. In conclusion, I agree with Keegan, that through all events, war became an inevitable prospect. However through my arguments and chosen sources we can see that the First World War was ultimately planned and due to miscalculation on Germanys part, brought forward to August 1914. Moreover, her argument that the war was the result of accident and miscalculation does not stand up. This is shown mostly in Fischers argument that ultimately she could have prevented a world war even though she planned some kind of war such was her control over Europe at this time.BIBLIOGRAPHYFISCHER, F., Germanys Aims in the First World War (London Chatto Windus, 1967) GORDON, M., Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War The British and the German Cases, Journal of Modern History, vol. 46 ( 1974) KAISER, D., Germany and the Origins of the First World War, Journal of Modern History, vol. 55 (1983) KEEGAN J., The First World War (London Pimlico, 1999) KEIGER, J., France and the Origins of the World War (London McMillan, 1983) WEHLER, H-U., The German Empire 1871-1918 (1985) WILSON, K., European Diplomacy 1871-1914, in PUGH, M, ed, A Companion to Modern European History 1871-1945 (Oxford Blackwell, 1997)